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Modern Zen and Psychoanalysis
The Semantic Connection
This paper attempts to locate modern Zen and psychoanalysis in terms of 
contemporary philosophy of mind, particularly in view of dominant theo-
ries of cognitivism that see the mind as informational and material, with 
meaning being mere information in disguise. Psychoanalysis and modern 
Zen hold to the contrary view that the mind is “semantic,” not “syntactic,” 
and that the meanings we have in our heads are not reducible to the physi-
cal informational processes from which they have emerged. Meaning, as 
non-reducible, is infinite and uncaused. However, the structure of mean-
ing entails a split between a knower and what is known. This split creates 
problems in the mind which can be confronted through more, not less, 
engagement with the meanings in our minds, until we are self-aware and, 
perhaps, self-identical, with the mechanisms of consciousness that produce 
the meanings in our head. Such self-awareness is seen as being self-liberat-
ing rather than self-reducing.
keywords:  Zen—psychoanalysis—Kyoto School—mind—language—
information—Nishida—Nishitani—Izutsu—Žižek 
Rossa Ó Muireartaigh 
Aichi Prefectural University
190
John Searle has made use of the concepts of the syntactic and the semantic in his work on the philosophy of mind.1 I will borrow these two concepts, 
giving them my own slant, to chart out an ongoing division in the area of 
the philosophy of mind and to make the argument that modern, Kyoto-
School inspired Zen and psychoanalysis sit together on one side of this 
divide in their joint espousal of the semantic element of the mind as being 
the supreme functioning mechanism of the mind.2
The syntactic and the semantic
Syntax can be seen as the idea that a language is generated ac-
cording to certain automatic and consistent rules that are of natural origin. 
The rules of syntax in natural language have not been consciously created 
by anyone. These rules can generate texts without, in their purest form, any 
particular reference to the meaning (the word to world connection) that 
a text is meant to generate. In other words, language does not need a con-
scious understanding mind or even a world “out there” to work. Syntax can 
be described as one paradigmatic case in the world of information process-
ing. Information is the demarcation of difference and, in the final analysis, is 
reducible to two components: a something (which we could, for example, 
1. See Cole 2015.
2. Both psychoanalysis and modern Zen share the same experience of having being sprung 
from their institutional moorings to become serious contributors to contemporary philosophi-
cal discourse. Since both movements start from the empirical, that is, the experiences of the 
practitioner, this can lead to assertions that both movements are “anti-philosophy” in nature. 
But, as Žižek remarked about Lacan, “My contestation when Lacan says ‘Je m' insurge; je suis 
contre la philosophie’ is well, welcome to the camp of philosophers!” In short, when you make 
claims about the world, there is no escaping philosophy. Cf. ŽiŽek 2010.
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demarcate as “1” (one) and everything else in the universe that is not part 
of this something; perhaps we can call all this “0” (zero). By linking syntax 
to information we can also link syntax to the wider physical natural world 
since the arrangements of natural systems in the world can be reduced, if 
we go far enough down the analytical chain, to the processing of informa-
tion. The universe is information in process. As Cesar A. Hidalgo has com-
mented: 
Most people think that information and computation are new things when 
in fact they are as old as the big bang. In the beginning, there was the bit, as 
my mit colleague Seth Lloyd likes to say… But what is information? Collo-
quially, people think of information as the messages we use to communicate 
the state of a system. But information, which is not the same as meaning, 
includes also the order embodied in these systems, not just the messages we 
use to describe them.3 [emphasis added]
This view of information as being dependent upon rules and non-subjec-
tive conditions is reflected in a cognitivist view of the mind where thinking 
(whether or not in the form of natural language) is an automatic process 
that can be traced to material (perhaps biochemical) causes. Conscious-
ness is an irrelevancy, a delusional confusion of cause and effect. The human 
mind is like a computer, a manipulator of information embedded in the 
material and natural world, which in itself operates on the basis of informa-
tion computed.4
The semantic view is that a language only has meaning when it is “read.” 
Syntax may be automatic and unconscious, but it only comes to life when 
it produces semantic content, something that has particular meaning for 
its reader. This semantic content cannot be reduced back to its syntactic 
components. This non-reducibility makes each unit of semantic content, or 
rather, moment of semantic content, unique and existing just as it is. How-
ever, semantic content is also flowing, generating new content incessantly. 
Semantic content is always “about something,” it gains meaning through 
3. Hidalgo 2015.
4. An example of the cognitivist argument can be found in David Dennett, who writes: “The 
phenomena of human consciousness have been explained… in terms of the operations of a vir-
tual machine, a sort of evolved (and evolving) computer program that shapes the activities of 
the brain” (Dennett 1991, 431).
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its connection with something else, something that it is not but which, we 
could say, it is constantly becoming. Unlike a bit of information, a moment 
of semantic content can never be further described in a way that fully repli-
cates it. The information unit “1” can be reproduced exactly, but the mean-
ing that “1” holds for the reader will always move on, beyond the grasp of 
any final unified understanding or “reading.” Each moment of semantic con-
tent is a shadow and reflection of other semantic content. Extending this 
semantic model to the human mind, the view here is that the mind is com-
posed of unique (in each moment) but (constantly) flowing conscious states. 
Conscious states are equivalent to semantic content in that they are momen-
tary, always “about something,” and are part of a wider flow from which 
they emerge and to which they contribute. The mind cannot be reduced to 
biochemistry because biochemistry can only work with information, never 
with the unique meanings such information generates in the mind. 
A view from everywhere and nowhere
It is said that science is the view from nowhere, in that science dis-
covers knowledge that is not dependent on the observer of this knowledge. 
1 plus 1 equals 2 everywhere in the universe, no matter what one’s vantage 
point. But rather than seeing science as a view from nowhere, it is perhaps 
better to see it as the view from everywhere. The ideal of science is not to 
be a neutral observer, since observers are themselves phenomena of the uni-
verse, but to attain observation without the medium of the observer. Such 
an observation can only be attained at a level of totality outside the world, 
where all is monitored at that place where all laws work as instant, eternal 
truths without the interference of observer parallax. A view from every-
where means one never has to position oneself within to get the “meaning” 
of a situation, a moment of time, an instance of phenomena, but can remain 
without, observing the information that forms the whole that transcends all 
particular moments. 
The syntactic or informational view, in its cognitive guise, sees conscious-
ness as irrelevant, perhaps non-existent. The universe moves through the 
dynamics of information, the constant reconfiguration of differences that 
the unconscious laws of the universe have generated and govern. There is 
no need for a conscious creator or God to explain the mysteries of human 
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consciousness since the laws of nature (information being processed) do this 
adequately.
In many ways, it would seem that a syntactic view of the mind could be 
made commensurable with Buddhism. Buddhism is a world religion with no 
belief in a personal creator. Buddhism sees the world as the flow of karma, 
a process of change governed by laws (rather than divine intentions). One 
Buddhist account of consciousness, which reduces it to the functioning of 
the ālayavijñāna (the great storehouse of consciousness) could, arguably, 
be made analogous to an evolutionary cognitivist model of the mind, in 
the sense that the seeds (bīja) stored in the ālayavijñāna are informational, 
rather than semantic, awaiting reorganization through the karmic dynamics 
of the mind. Our consciousness, which reads the world for significant stand-
alone particulars (semantic content) is built on a differentiating function 
that fails to see the world as it really is: the constant rearrangement of bits 
of information which mean nothing in themselves. For example, Buddhism, 
which espouses the idea of One Mind with two aspects (one pure and one 
defiled), as we see in The Awakening of the Faith, could be seen to cohere 
with this view. There is no God, no self, no true meaning in the mind, just 
the pure suchness of information in its organized totality, which only looks 
like meaningful phenomena in motion because it is being seen from the illu-
sionary semantic visions, the māyā, of the mind in its deluded aspect.5 
5. Batchelor describes well how the Buddhist view coheres with a naturalist view: 
We have been created, molded, formed by a bewildering matrix of contingencies that have 
preceded us. From the patterning of the DNA derived from our parents to the firing of 
the hundred billion neurons in our brains to the cultural and historical conditioning of 
the twentieth century to the education and upbringing given us to all the experiences we 
have ever had and choices we have ever made: these have conspired to configure the unique 
trajectory that culminates in this present moment What is here now is the unrepeatable im-
pression left by all of this, which we call ‘me.’ Yet so vivid and startling is this image that we 
confuse what is a mere impression for something that exists independently of what formed 
it. (Batchelor 1997, 82)
Owen Flanagan does take up the question of how much Buddhism can be aligned with a ma-
terialist view. He feels, though, after an examination of various statements by the Dalai Lama, 
that Buddhism is unable to go the whole way with Darwinian and cognitivist materialism, and 
the view that life is a biological accident. Buddhism is still too attached to information having a 
meaning. Flanagan comments:
There is no longer any need for bewilderment, befuddlement, or mysterianism from Bud-
dhism or any other great spiritual tradition in the face of the overwhelming evidence that all 
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However, whilst Buddhism purports two aspects of the mind, and 
declares one to be pure and unborn, and the other to be plagued with delu-
sions based on differentiations (which, to stay consistent with my argument, 
can be described here as that which appears as meaning in our everyday 
mind), Buddhism also asserts the importance of not eradicating (or in phi-
losophy of mind terms “eliminating”) this non-permanent mind and the dif-
ferentiated semantic experiences it encounters. The Śūraṅgama sūtra asks: 
“There is the pure Tathāgata, so why immediately rivers, mountains, earth?” 
(清浄本然伝可忽生山河大地). Why indeed? As Izutsu Toshihiko points out, 
“A really concrete individual must be, for Zen, an individual-concrete which 
is permeated and penetrated by the absolute-universal, or rather which is 
the absolute universal.”6 In other words, our being in the world cannot be 
analyzed away. Tang dynasty Zen master Linji’s “true person without rank” 
is not without being (or let us say “becoming,” should “being” sound too 
essentialist). In Linji’s world “… the person here listening to the Dharma has 
no form, no characteristics, no root, no beginning, no place he abides, yet he 
is vibrantly alive.”7 
What is at issue here is the inadequacy of a view from everywhere. Any 
ideology that excludes accounts of conscious moments as having any mean-
ing in themselves suffers a poverty of explanatory power. The view from 
everywhere cannot explain why moments of absolute particularity—views 
from somewhere—arise. In the view from everywhere, all the 1s and 0s that 
make up the information of our universe must be equal, there cannot be any 
1 that is more meaningful than other 1s, since this would create a break-
down in the laws of syntax, the computation of information. Through this 
equalizing vision, the sciences, both natural and social, with their collective 
view from everywhere, have a universalized and totalizing reach. And yet, 
as Nishitani Keiji points out “There remains, however, one basic question: 
what on earth is this man himself who is endowed with, among other abili-
ties, the very capacity of inquiring in so scientific a way into the mechanisms 
experience takes place in our embodied nervous systems in the world, the natural world, the 
only world there is. (Flanagan 2011, 90)
6. Izutsu 1982, 49.
7. Watson 1993, 36.
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of nature, society and human consciousness? To this question these sciences 
are unable to answer.”8 
If, however, we reject such a view from everywhere, and assert an alterna-
tive view, a view from nowhere, a view that sees the semantic as an authentic 
and eternal phenomenon of our universe that cannot be reduced to any-
thing else (there is no other something behind it), then perhaps the view 
from somewhere is less of a mystery. I wish to argue here that this view from 
nowhere is a view based on a semantic model of the mind, and that it is the 
view that psychoanalysis and modern Zen, as opposed to cognitivism, can 
be seen to share.
To begin with, I want to broadly summarize the common trajectory that 
modern Zen and psychoanalysis find themselves following. It is a trajectory 
based on a number of assumptions about the mind and the Self that both 
movements hold. Firstly, both Zen and psychoanalysis see the self as being 
composite and hence impermanent. This is the truth of anātman, the rejec-
tion of any philosophy that espouses an essentialist notion of a coherent 
Self. However, the composition of the Self does not occur along the lines of 
simple modules being fitted together to produce a seamless system of con-
sciousness. Instead, the view is that the mind is composed of intricate layers 
or zones of consciousness, which are not laid out in neat segments, but have 
an utterly unavoidable tendency to leak into one another. Trying to describe 
the source and symptoms of such leakage is what has propelled much of the 
divisions in contemporary psychoanalysis. The overriding metaphors used 
to describe the assembled structure of the mind (Is the mind like Freud-
ian hydraulics or Jungian geology?) may be hard to grasp, but the core idea 
remains the same: the mind is operating in different (semantic, non-physi-
cal) modes, and only some of these operations ever make it to explicit con-
sciousness.
Both psychoanalysis and Zen do afford consciousness a knowing func-
tion, a self-reflectivity, which can turn back on the unconscious and subcon-
scious compositionality in a way that re-endows the conscious Self with a 
momentary agency and empowerment that a cognitive model of the mind 
would instinctively wish to dismiss. For both traditions, the truth about 
the mind is accessed from within, through introspection and manipula-
8. Nishitani 1965, 106.
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tion of conscious processes, rather than from without, through neurological 
enquiry. This search from within is based upon a philosophy of the mind 
that coheres with what I am arguing to be the semantic view, the idea that 
conscious states have meaning that cannot be reduced to the syntactic vehi-
cles of information that gave rise to them. 
Both Zen and psychoanalysis take their start not from the first bit of infor-
mation after the Big Bang, but in the hereness and the being-in-the-world 
nature of existence. In contrast to the view from everywhere, which sees the 
world in all its information, without the distraction of personal meaning, 
Zen and psychoanalysis have a view from nowhere. This is the view that 
looks at the world from within, where meaning (semantic content) can be 
seen (or “read”). This vision is from a standpoint so localized and immanent 
to its own hereness that there is nothing further within upon which it can 
be grounded. It is in this sense that it is a view from nowhere. This semantic 
standpoint is based on two positions that, being contradictory, describe a 
dialect. Firstly, meaning is impermanent (viz., 1 is never really not 0) and, 
secondly, meaning is infinite (viz., when meaning arises, that is all that arises, 
a meaning-experience is self-contained, pure, and absolute).
The semantic view from nowhere
Let us explore further the justifications for the claim that meaning 
is infinite but utterly impermanent. 
The most unusual thing about meaning is that it arises in the mind ex 
nihilo. According to Kalam’s law of causality, “whatever begins to exist has a 
cause.”9 This is true for everything in the universe—except meaning in mind. 
Cause-effect descriptions, such as the cognitive model, can explain the con-
ditions in which conscious meaning will arise (the existence of certain neu-
rological structures, brain chemicals, and so on), but it cannot explain the 
actual link of a brain condition (the third-person view) to conscious mean-
ing (the “I” view) link. As Nishida Kitarō wrote: 
Even if modern physiological psychology advances to the point where we 
can physically or chemically explain each of the functions of the brain at the 
9. Craig 2008, 111.
Ó muireartaigh: modern zen and psychoanalysis | 197
base of consciousness, will we thereby be able to assert that phenomena of 
consciousness are controlled by a mechanical law of necessity?… So-called 
spiritual meaning cannot be seen, heard, or counted; it transcends the laws of 
mechanical necessity.10
The cognitive view provides correlational descriptions, not casual ones. 
We know this because the same cognitive explanations used to elucidate 
consciousness through cause and effect models also work for artificial 
nonconscious devices, such as super-computers, and for the zombies of 
contemporary philosophy of the mind, Gedanken.11 A moment of mean-
ing in the mind defies causal explanation. It is extraneous; it appears out of 
nowhere.12 As such, it defies explanation from a view from everywhere. It 
can only be viewed from nowhere.
Meaning can also be described as “infinite.” I use this word to relate the 
sense that a moment of meaning has an absolute quality to it. A moment 
10. Nishida 1987, 97–8.
11. Kirk 2015.
12. My assertion that meaning in the mind as experienced by the knowing “I” has no cause 
would probably not upset too many Zen adherents for whom cause-effect is a projection onto 
the world from our minds. However, psychoanalysis may not like the transcendentalism im-
plied in this view. Psychoanalysis tries hard not to venture beyond science. However, former, 
and now anti-Lacanian Dylan Evans claims (2005), psychoanalysis has been eclipsed, per-
haps even disproved by modern neuroscience, and only still exists as an intellectual movement 
through its adherence to a (possibly anti-scientific) Romantic humanist vision. Psychoanaly-
sis still holds out for the existence of a self-conscious self beyond our neurological hardwiring. 
Asserting this meaning-knowing self and, at the same time, keeping within the bounds of sci-
entific respectability (through conformity with cognitivist and materialist beliefs) involves in-
tricate ontological and epistemological moves that, in fact, do start to sound like Linji Zen in 
modern lingo. For instance, here is what Žižek has to say: “The ‘mental’ itself explodes within 
the neuronal through a kind of ‘ontological explosion’.” And again:
“Self ” is the elementary form of escaping the “control of solid earth” through self-relating. 
As such, it underlies all other forms: the self-relating of the agent of perception/awareness, as 
it were, creates (opens up) the scene on which “conscious content” can appear; it provides the 
universal form of this content, the stage on which the preprocessing work of mediation can 
collapse into the immediate “raw” givenness of its product. The magic trick of self-relating 
lies in the way my very “decenterment”—the impossibility of the I’s immediate self-presence, 
the necessity of what Derrida would have called neural différance, of the minimal detour 
through the past mnesic traces …. 
However, such images of ontological explosions and magic tricks of self-relating suggest quite 
strongly the real “impossibility of the I’s immediate self-presence”: the impossibility of explain-
ing the I’s actual existence in terms of its neural wirings. See Žižek 2006, 210, 213.
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of meaning is self-contained, it is pure. For something to be meaningful it 
must be understood on absolute grounds. Even when something appears to 
us as vague and half-understood, we still have absolute understanding that 
something has appeared to us vague and half-understood. Meaning can only 
work if our moments of meaning are pure. Otherwise, meaning is not tak-
ing place. If meaning is not infinite and pure, then all we have are random, 
unreadable phenomena that have no “meaning,” that are mere information 
in computation. 
These two aspects of meaning, the fact that it has no cause and the fact 
that it is infinite point to the nature of meaning as irreducible to any other 
phenomenon in the universe. It is, in itself, without phenomenal form. It is 
empty.
Meaning arises in the mind of a knower. But this knower must be effaced, 
must remain unknown for meaning to emerge. The knower cannot be 
included in the moment of knowing. To include the knower would cre-
ate incoherence, an infinite regress as knower knows that they know that 
they knows, and so on. There must be no consciousness of the knower for 
a moment of meaning to arise. However, this effacement of the knower is 
based on the delusion that the knower is not part of the structure that is 
creating the knowing. It is based on the delusion that an essential know-
ing subject can operate in a world without that world touching upon the 
knower and undermining the assumed essentialized and detached nature of 
the knower’s subjectivity.
The problem, then, is that meaning in the world is generated by some-
thing being left out, namely oneself. One description of this process, for 
example, is Alenka Zupančič’s account of Lacan’s impossible choice between 
“being and meaning.”13 This removal of the knower is essential to meaning 
but it is also, both Zen and psychoanalysis would argue, the source of our 
woes. This is because the split between knowing subject and known object 
is a delusion that is never fully overcome. It may remain repressed, covered 
over by soothing ideology that magically wipes the split away through asser-
tions that one’s detached and alienated view is really one of objectivity, rea-
son, and common sense. However, the split from the world we experience 
in our acts of knowing the world, creates alienation from the world which 
13. Zupančič 2008, 22.
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haunts the mind of the knower in background unconscious traces that can 
reemerge in symptoms of dissatisfaction with the world: dukkha, existential 
ennui, and so on.
Liberation through self-awareness
Both psychoanalysis and Zen will have, at some point in their 
diagnosis of our ills, a soteriological vision of our potential to overcome such 
ills through acts of radical self-awareness of ourselves in the world, that is, 
authentic awareness of ourselves as being both the generator and the victim 
of our acts of alienation.14 It is as if by simply being aware of the machinery 
of this dualistic, scissarous (to borrow Lacan’s adjective) meaning-genera-
tion semantic structure that functions in our minds, we can embark upon 
our first steps towards wholeness (i.e., a reconnection with the world) and 
freedom (i.e., space to be, apart from a world that interpellates us, makes us 
what Linji calls a true person without rank). The point is that this act of lib-
eration is not achieved through a negation of meaning or transcendence of 
meaning but through a (meaningful) awareness that meaning in our minds 
14. Alan Watts summarizes this convergence between Zen and psychoanalysis (although he 
uses the broader terms “Eastern ways of life and “Western psychotherapy”):
The main resemblance between the Eastern way of life and Western psychotherapy is in the 
concern of both with bringing about changes of consciousness, changes in our ways of feel-
ing our own existence and our relation to human society and the natural world. The psycho-
therapist has, for the most part, been interested in changing the consciousness of peculiarly 
disturbed individuals. The disciplines of Buddhism and Taoism are, however, concerned 
with changing the consciousness of normal, socially adjusted people. But it is increasingly 
apparent to psychotherapists that the normal state of consciousness in our culture is both 
the context and the breeding ground of mental disease. A complex of societies of vast mate-
rial wealth bent on mutual destruction is anything but a condition of social health. (Watts 
1969, 15–16)
This view of the power and necessity of self-awareness for liberation from self-enslavement 
is also to be found in Eric Fromm (1950). Žižek may be said to lean towards a similar posi-
tion in arguing that when we achieve psychoanalytic awareness as to how we are determined 
we also see how we are free. He concludes: “Lacan's maxim ‘Do not compromise your desire!’ 
fully endorses the pragmatic paradox of ordering you to be free: it exhorts you to dare” (Žižek 
1999, 118–19). On the Zen side, D. T. Suzuki quotes Tang-period Zen master Huineng as say-
ing “When Prajñā with its light reflects [within], and penetratingly illumines inside and out-
side, you recognize your own Mind. When your own Mind is recognized, there is emancipation 
from you” (Suzuki 1969, 127). 
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is the most fundamental ground of our humanity but one that needs to be 
engaged with further.15 
Obviously, the liberation that Zen and psychoanalysis advocate comes 
in many guises: suburban feel-good therapy, psychological recovery, social 
revolution and Bodhisattva-hood. The point, though, remains the same. We 
can rearrange the meaning in our lives by looking hard at the meanings we 
impose on our world. It can all begin in the mind—from nowhere.
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